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CRITIQUE: CONTRACTS TO MAKE A WILL
MAX RHEINSTEIN

N THE development of American law the role of learned writing
has been constantly increasing. Such writing has become so significant that American law has reached a stage at which it no longer
exhibits exclusively those traits which are characteristic of a purely
judge-made law. It has assumed new aspects which reflect the systematic thought of the law teacher or the deeply cutting analysis of
the scholar.' There is yet missing, however, a kind of writing which
has for generations constituted an essential, if not perhaps the principal, part of the legal literature of the continental countries-the legal
monograph. The cause is entirely external. The high cost of printing
has limited the production of law books to those two types for which
a wide market can be expected-the text and case book for law students, and the reference book for the practitioners. In rare cases the
author of a learned inquiry into a topic of limited scope has been
fortunate enough to obtain the subsidy necessary to pay for the cost
of publication. As a rule, however, authorship must be adjusted to
the facilities of the law reviews. If the author limits his inquiry so
that the results of his investigation and thought can be condensed in
thirty pages, he can expect to find his brainchild presented to the
world in some one of our numerous law reviews, which are financed
as educational tools rather than as organs for publication of the results of learning. If the author has chosen a topic of major scope,
he must either expect that the typewritten copies of what is usually
his doctoral thesis remain hidden in a university library, or he has
to cut up his work in small pieces and, with much effort, distribute
it over a number of law reviews. While a work published in this
Max Rheinstein is Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law at the University of
Chicago Law School.
This paper is a critique of six law review articles on contracts to makc a will
written by Bertel M. Sparks, Professor of Law at the New York University School of
Law, and a Member of the Kentucky Bar. These articles were published as follows:
Historical Development of the Law of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 42 Ky.
LJ. 573 (1954).
Problems in the Formation of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath, 40 Cornell L.Q.
60 (1954).
Legal Effect of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath Prior to the Dealth of the
Promisor: I & II, 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 215 (1954).
Enforcement of Contracts to Devise or Bequeath After the Death of the Promisor,
39 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1954).
Contract to Devise or Bequeath as an Estate Planning Device, 20 Mo. L. Rev. 1
(1955).
1 Cf. Rheinstein, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society lix (1954).
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fashion is at least not entirely lost to the reading public, few readers
will be able to profit from it as a coherent whole. Also, since the work
does not constitute a book, it will not be reviewed.
That fact not only means that the existence of the work will not
be made sufficiently known but also that it cannot fully exercise its impact upon legal learning. In a serious review of a serious book the
reviewer tries to indicate those features which constitute the author's
specific merits, to engage with him in a conversation of creative critique, and thus to stimulate further thought beyond the author's own
contribution to learning.
It is the purpose of this critique to draw attention to a series of
six law review articles by Professor Bertel M. Sparks of the New
York University School of Law, which are spread over five different
law reviews but which belong together as the several parts of a comprehensive monograph on the important and difficult topic of contracts
to devise and bequeath. This monograph, which was written as an
S.J.D. thesis presented to the University of Michigan Law School,
constitutes a significant contribution to legal learning. Altogether, the
six articles cover 165 pages of law review format. They should be
available as a book. Since they are not, we regard it as a duty at
least to review them as they would be if they had been published
as a book.
The contract to devise and bequeath or, as we may call it more
concisely, the contract to make a will is not among the devices
favored by the bar for estate-planning purposes. But it is widely
used by laymen; it has, perhaps for that reason, figured in a considerable amount of litigation; and it is, as pointed out by Sparks,
an appropriate, and under certain circumstances the only available,
tool to achieve a number of legitimate ends.
Among aged men and women of modest means, and the vast majority
of the aged are of modest means, there is a strong desire to retain
ownership of what property they possess until death. There is also
the desire, and it might be said the necessity, to provide care, support,
and maintenance, and in many instances, companionship and society,
for themselves. A contract to make a will is the only legal device
through which this purpose can be achieved.2
Another purpose for which the contract to make a will is the most
appropriate device is that of giving a home and the prospect of an
inheritance to an infant child expected to give in return his filial devotion. The contract also lends itself well to the settlement of the
mutual property rights of elderly people who are about to marry each
other and are anxious to provide for the moral obligations which each
2 20 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1955).
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of them may have toward the offspring of a prior marriage, or toward
other relatives or charities. For still other purposes the contract to
make a will is used in property settlements made upon divorce or separation, or as a device for maintaining control of a corporation, a means
for planning the disposition of partnership assets, or a method by which
an employer is sometimes enabled to retain an especially valuable
employee.
A contract to make a will is a contract by which one party promises the other that he will execute a will in which a devise or legacy as
agreed upon will be given to the promisee or to a third party. Closely
related, and consequently covered in the author's work, are the socalled mutual wills. Two testators, who have either executed separate
testamentary instruments, or have expressed their testamentary dispositions jointly in one single "joint will," have made dispositions
in which either provides for a benefit for the other or for third persons in whom the other is interested.
Under a view expressed in a good many cases as well as in legal
writing the contract to make a will and the device of mutual wills
are two separate and distinct legal institutions. The contract to make
a will is a contract, i.e., a transaction by which one party promises
that he will perform a certain act, viz., die having validly made and
maintained in effect a will containing certain terms. If the promise is
kept so that such a will is in effect when the promisor dies, the contract has been properly performed and the beneficiary takes the legacy
or devise which is contained in his favor in the instrument. If the
promisor dies without such a will being in effect at the time of his
death, he has broken his contract and the promisee or third party
beneficiary is thrown upon his remedies for the breach of the contract. The exact determination of these remedies has been the subject
matter of much litigation and constitutes one of the major topics of
Professor Sparks' work. 3 To all practical effects it is recognized today
that a will which has been made by the promisor in conformity with
his contract is revocable like any other will. There is no special
category of "will made in conformity with a contract," which would
be distinguished from other wills by irrevocability. If the will is revoked the testator may be guilty of a breach of contract, and the
claims arising therefrom will affect his estate, but the instrument so
revoked cannot be admitted to probate, nor can probate be denied to
another instrument on the ground that it is contrary to the contractual
duty of the testator.
While all these propositions are almost universally recognized, it
3 39 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1954).
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is maintained, however, in a good many cases and by several writers,
that in the case of mutual wills the testamentary dispositions of the
survivor become irrevocable as soon as he has accepted the benefits
-which have been given to him in the will of the predeceasing party.
Any attempt after that moment to revoke or change the reciprocal
provisions contained in the will of the survivor is, according to this
view, ineffective. In spite of an attempted and otherwise valid revocation, the instrument containing the reciprocal dispositions of the
survivor is to be admitted to probate, while, on the other hand, an
instrument containing provisions incompatible with those of the
original mutual will of the survivor is to be rejected. In two other
respects special treatment has been claimed for mutual wills. He who
seeks to enforce a claim based upon an alleged contract to make a will
has the burden of proving that such a contract has actually been
concluded in his favor, and for the proof of the conclusion of such
a contract strict and convincing proof is required. For the case of
mutual wills it has been maintained, however, that their mere existence raises the presumption of a contract, or even that the will becomes binding upon the survivor, independent of any contract, by the
survivor's mere acceptance of the benefits given to him in the will
of the predeceasing party. In apparent contradiction to this strictness it is simultaneously maintained, however, that neither party is
bound as long as both are alive. Either one is said to be free unilaterally and without the other's consent to revoke his will provided
only that he informs the other party of such revocation.
In three respects mutual wills are thus said to be different from
wills made in conformity with a contract to devise and bequeath, respects of such importance that mutual wills appear to constitute a legal
device different from the contract to make a will. This view is vigorously opposed by Professor Sparks.4 He argues that the report of the
English case which is commonly regarded as the fountainhead of the
special doctrines of mutual will, i.e., Lord Camden's decision in Dzifour v. Pereirasis incomplete and incorrect, and that the device of
an irrevocable testamentary disposition does not fit in with our system
of law in which a will is by definition ambulatory. Professor Sparks'
argument is correct. Hargrave's account of Diefour v. Pereira'makes
it clear indeed that in Dickens' report of Dufour v. Pereira an essential passage has been omitted and that Lord Camden was far from
pronouncing the rule which has been ascribed to him by later judges.
However, later judges have acted upon the basis of such a rule, mis4 42 Ky. L.J. 573, 575 (1954); 39 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 2 (1954).
5 1 Dick. 419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (1769).
6 2 Hargrave, Jurisconsult Exerdtations 99 (1811).

HeinOnline -- 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1227 1955

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

taken though they may have been about its origin. Might we not have
to say that by so doing the judges have created the rule for their
respective jurisdictions and have thereby created a new kind of disposition mortis causa which, in contrast to the traditional will, is
rendered irrevocable by judicial fiat. After all, our legal system is
one of judge-made law, and the mere fact that a judicial opinion
originated in a historical misunderstanding does not deprive it of its
force as precedent.
It is, of course, a different question whether it is wise to establish
a new kind of disposition mortis causa which, in contrast to the traditional will, becomes irrevocable at a certain moment but, in contrast
to the will made in pursuance of a contract, may, up to another
moment, be unilaterally revoked by the testator without exposing
his estate to claims for breach of contract. Our author does not engage in a discussion of policy. What matters is whether or not there
exists a legitimate demand for a transaction of such a special kind.
In this respect comparative law can give us some clues. The
Romans could do without such a transaction, and in modern Roman
law it did not appear until about the same time at which it entered
upon the scene in England, i.e., the late seventeenth century. Just as
in England, the lawyers were puzzled by the problems presented by
the institution, and nearly all the problems which have arisen in our
law came to be discussed in the usus modernus Pandectarum.7 Contemporary American law might indeed profit from the extensive
discussions, especially those of the nineteenth century German writers.' At the present time "hereditary pacts," as they came to be called
in the civil law, are far from being universally recognized.9 As a
matter of fact, in that form in which the contract to make a will has
been developed since the eighteenth century in Anglo-American law, it
is not recognized in the civil-law countries at all. On the contrary, a
contract by which a party promises to make and maintain in effect
a testamentary disposition of a certain kind is regarded as being incompatible with the great principle of freedom of testation, and thus
null and void as contrary to public policy.10
But, strangely enough, in some countries the hereditary pact
has been recognized in the more severe shape of irrevocability of the
7 See Kipp, Erbrecht 134 (9th ed., Coing, 1953).
8 See especially, Beseler, Die Lehre von den Erbvertragen 2 vols. (1834-1840);

Hartmann, Zur Lehre von den Erbvertregen und den gemeinschaftlichen Testamenten
(1860).
9 A world-wide survey is given by Rihl, Erbvertrag, Rechtsvergleichendes Hand.
wi5rterbuch (1932).
10 French Civ. Code arts. 1130, 1389 (1804); German Civ. Code § 2302 (1896);
Italian Civ. Code art. 458 (1942). But see Swiss Civ. Code art. 494 (1907).
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will made in pursuance of a contract. As a matter of fact, in the
German Civil Code of 1896 three different kinds of disposition
mortis causa have been established: the testament, the hereditary pact,
and the institution of mutual wills. The testament is the unilateral
transaction in which a testator disposes of his assets for the case of
his death. Like the last will and testament of our law it is ambulatory. 1 A hereditary pact, however, is a bilateral transaction by which
dispositions mortis causa are made by one party or by both. It is
not a contract by which a party binds himself to make and maintain
in effect a disposition mortis causa, but it constitutes that disposition
in and by itself. Being simultaneously a transaction agreed upon and
participated in by two parties, the disposition of either is not, as a
general rule, revocable without the other's consent.'- Half way between the testament and the hereditary pact stands the institution
of the joint will containing reciprocal provisions. In contrast to the
hereditary pact, which may be concluded between any two or more
persons, a joint will cannot be made by anyone except a husband and
his wife.13 If in such a joint will the parties have made provisions in
favor of each other or if each party has made provisions in favor of
a person "who is close to the other," the provisions are presumed to
have been intended as mutual.' 4 As long as both parties live, each is
free to revoke his own dispositions, provided the other party is notified. If one party's disposition is revoked, the other party's automatically becomes ineffective. But after the death of one party, the
survivor can no longer revoke his disposition if he has accepted the
benefits which have been given to him under the disposition of the
predeceasing spouse.' 5
This joint and mutual will, as established by the German Code,
has exactly the same features which have been claimed for mutual
wills in this country. The institution was not provided for in the draft
of the Code, which had been prepared with great care over a period
of thirteen years. It was inserted at a late stage of the legislative
process upon the argument that its recognition was necessary to
correspond to a widely felt need.'0 Even today, more than fifty years
11 German Civ. Code § 1937-40, 2253 (1896).
12 Id. §§ 1941, 2278, 2290-92. Under the French Code such a transaction can be
made only in connection with an antenuptial settlement; under art. 1091 et nq. binding

dispositions can be made by the parties to the future marriage in favor of each other
or of their future issue; according to art. 1082 binding dispositions in favor of the
future spouses or their future issue can also be made, as a part of the antenuptial
settlement, by a third party. See also, Austrian Civ. Code §§ 249-1254 (1811).
13 German Civ. Code § 2365 (1896).
14 Id. § 2270.
15 Id. § 2271.
16 Cf. Kipp, op. cit. supra note 7, at 115.

HeinOnline -- 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1229 1955

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

after the adoption of the Code, occasional skepticism is expressed
as to the actuality of the need. 17 The institution seems to be widely
used, however, and it does not appear to have given rise to dissatisfaction. This German experience might well be pondered before we
cut off, for reasons of mental symmetry, an institution which the
courts have set out to develop in apparent response to a demand of
the public. How urgent this demand is and whether its satisfaction
justifies the birth pains which have been connected with the new institution of the mutual will might also be found out, to some extent
at least, through experienced American probate lawyers and judges,
especially those who are familiar with the legal needs of people of
modest means.
In the first of his articles18 Professor Sparks traces the history
of the institution insofar as it has found expression in published
judicial opinions. He is unquestionably correct inhis insistence that
Dufour v. Pereira9 has been misunderstood and that a great many
difficulties and controversies which have appeared in the American
cases could have been avoided if the courts had analyzed the institution with greater clarity. Professor Sparks' own presentation has the
great merit that the legal concepts which have gone into the making
of the contract to make a will are used in a clean and consistent
fashion. In such a craftsmanlike approach the questions are asked in
the proper fashion and the right answers consequently follow with
necessity.
The contract to make a will, we are told with apt insistence, is a
contract. It is neither a will, nor a conveyance of a remainder interest
with the reservation of a life estate in the grantor,2 0 nor the creation
of an express trust.y The will executed in pursuance of the contract
is a will like any other rather than one of a peculiar kind. For the
conclusion of the contract all regular requirements of the law of contracts must be fulfilled, such as offer and acceptance, consideration,
and compliance with the Statute of Frauds, wherever by its content
a particular contract to make a will falls under Section 4 or Section
17 of the Statute.2 2 No remedy can be granted upon the contract
unless its conclusion is proved clearly and convincingly. 3 Indeed, the
evidentiary requirements must be particularly strict because the
party against whose estate claims are made is dead and thus unable to
17 Ibid.
18 42 Ky. L.J. 573 (1954).

19
20
21
22
23

1 Dick. 419, 21 Eng. Rep. 332 (1769) ; see supra p. 1227.
53 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 219 (1954).
Id. at 215.
40 Cornell L.Q. 60, 73 (1954).
Id. at 61.
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contradict the factual allegations of the claimant. 41 The typical dead
man's statute is regarded as an insufficient protection against spurious
claims. 5 Although it appears that some meritorious claims may be
thwarted by such evidentiary strictness, the author could have found
support for his position in those provisions of the laws of France,
Germany, and Switzerland which require for a hereditary pact the
special solemnity of conclusion before and recordation by an officially
patented conveyancing counsel (notarius) or judge.20
That a contract to make a will is a contract in the ordinary sense
is of special importance in the case of its breach, which consists
in the promisor's failure to have in effect at the time of his death a
will corresponding to the terms of his promise. The ordinary remedy
for such breach is an action at law for damages, to be prosecuted
against the estate of the promisor-decedent in the same manner as
any other claim sought to be enforced against a decedent's estate,
which means, among other things, that it is not to be paid out of assets
of the estate unless it has been filed within the period of the statute of
nonclaims. 2 7
Where the remedy at law is insufficient, equitable relief can be
had as in all other cases.Fs This remedy is particularly useful where
the promisee seeks to follow into the hands of a third party a particular asset which the decedent had promised to devise or bequeath
to him, and also where the promisor was to leave to the promisee the
promisor's entire estate or a fraction thereof. In that latter case the
remedy at law is insufficient because the court of law does not have
adequate machinery to ascertain, and safeguard the payment of, those
debts, taxes, administration expenses, and possible other claims which
must be satisfied before the claim of the promisee. In order to achieve
these results it is neither necessary nor helpful to speak of the imposition of a trust, constructive or otherwise; the common rules on the
grant of equitable remedies in the case of inadequacy of the remedy
at law suffice for all legitimate purposes,
Awareness of the fact that we are dealing with a contract also
enables us to grant the promisee all those remedies which he may need
during the promisor's lifetime to protect himself against possible
frustration of his expectation by the promisor. - O Like any other
contract the contract to make a will must be interpreted, and in the
24 Id. at 62.
25 Id. at 72.
26 German Civ. Code § 2276 (1896); French Civ. Code arts. 1084, 1394 (1804);
Swiss Civ. Code art. 512 (1907).
27 39 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 10, 45 (1954).
28 Id. at 17.
29 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 215 (1954).
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interpretation we must pay attention to the ends pursued by the
parties. It is the characteristic feature of a contract to make a will
that one party is to be compensated for a present performance, such
as his taking care of the needs of the other party, by a future act
of the latter. This latter party promises that he will see to it that
upon his death the other will receive a certain sum of money, a
specific piece of land, chattel, or chose in action, or the totality or a
fraction of his estate. Except for the last named, these purposes might
also be achieved by a present promise of money to become payable,
or a present transfer to become effective, upon the grantor's death.
However, such devices would deprive the grantor of all possibility of
using for his own purposes the assets affected by the contract. Here
we encounter the special reason why parties may resort to the contract
to make a will. It is designed to permit the grantor to sell or otherwise
dispose of his assets insofar as he needs them for the satisfaction of
his normal needs of life.
He is not supposed, however, to thwart the expectation of the
promisee by squandering his assets irresponsibly or by making gifts
of them to other persons. The promisor maintains his power to dispose of his assets, but he has no right to do so in a manner which will
frustrate the purposes of his contract. Courts have found it difficult
both to find a basis for this obligation of the promisor and to define
its scope. Influenced by the term contract to make a will, they have
at times been at a loss to see how there could be any duties before
the promisor's death. Professor Sparks demonstrates that the existence of such duties simply follows from the principle of good faith,
which, as he shows by examples, requires in contracts of sale, lease,
services, and other types, the promisor to do a good deal more than
is indicated by the literal meaning of the bare words of his promise,8 0
These statements of Professor Sparks constitute a neat example
of what has long been known in the civil law as the doctrine of auxiliary contractual duties. There is rarely a contract in which the
promisor would have to do no more than literally perform the terms of
his promise. In the infancy of a legal system a seller may just have
to obtain the goods without being under the additional duty to protect
them against loss up to the time of delivery. Nowadays we require
the seller of a business within reasonable limits to refrain from competing with the buyer, the employee to safeguard the employer's
business secrets, and the landlord of an apartment building to keep
the entrance and the stairs reasonably safe for the tenants' use. Especially in German legal doctrine and practice much attention has
been devoted to this determination of contractual auxiliary duties
30 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 6-15.
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(vertragliche Nebenpflichten), 31 and the basis for them is being found
in exactly that provision of the Civil Code which tells a promisor
by good faith and fair
that he is to keep his contract as is "required
3 2dealing and in view of general custom. "
In this context the reference to general custom is as important
as that to good faith and fair dealing. In every type of contract certain terms are implied as normal, although not as invariable. In a
contract of sale it is normally implied that the seller has to deliver
within a reasonable time and at his place of business, that he warrants
the absence of certain defects of quality and title, etc. All these terms
can be varied for a particular contract by express agreement of the
parties; but unless they are so varied, they are regarded as impliedly
agreed upon. In a similar way terms regarded as being normally implied have, over the course of time, been worked out for other types
of contract such as partnership, lease, contract for services, bailment,
loan, etc. In the civil law this process has been carried on more
consciously and systematically. For each type of contract the PostGlossators and their successors have come to work out those terms
which, as so-called naturalia negotii, are regarded as binding the
parties unless they have, in an individual transaction, been contracted
out or replaced by special terms of the parties' own choosing. Unless
so excluded, the type terms apply as the law of the contract, which,
however, as it can be eliminated by the parties' own terms, is called
"dispositive law" (ius dispositivum), in contrast to those norms which,

as for instance those of the Statute of Frauds, apply without regard to
any individual party's wishes and are thus called norms of strict or
cogent law (ius strictum, ius cogens). As the rules of dispositive law
apply only insofar as they have not been replaced by the contracting
parties' own particular terms, we can also say that they have the function of filling in those gaps in the scheme of a transaction for which
the parties have not made their own rules, so that we may also refer
to the ius dispositivun as stop-gap law.,
The general theory of ius dispositivum has been highly developed
in the civil law,3" and awareness of its function may be of use in
connection with our institution, the contract to make a will. That
institution has now existed in our law long enough to allow us to
formulate those terms which are to be understood to be meant in the
31

Cf. Lehmann, Recht der SchuldverhItnisse 16 (14th ed. 1954); Siebert, An-

notations to § 242 in Soergel, BUrgerliches Gesetzbuch 569 (8th ed. 1952).
32 German Civ. Code § 242 (1896).
33 Cf. Rheinstein, Law of Decedents' Estates 381, 473 (2d ed. 1955); Wright,
Opposition of the Law to Business Usages, 26 Col. L. Rev. 917 (1926).
3- Cf. Nipperdey, Lehrbuch des bfirgerflchen Rechts, Allgemeiner Tell 132 (13th
ed. 1931).
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normal case by the normal parties who have neither chosen to supplant them by their own terms expressly, nor have given to their transaction such an unusual shape that the normal terms cannot well be regarded as being fit for their case. The terms normally to be implied
in a contract to make a will are exactly those which define the extent
of the right to which the promisor is allowed to make use of his power
of disposition of his assets. What is that "normal course of events"
within which the promisor may consume or otherwise use his assets?
Does he breach his contractual duty when he makes any donation,
or is he allowed to make certain donations, for instance those which
are expected of a man of his status in life by custom and good mores?
Or is the contract broken only when the promisor makes a donation
with the specific intent to frustrate the promisee's expectation? Also,
under what circumstances may the promisor be allowed to rescind
the contract upon such grounds as failure of consideration or basic
change of circumstances? All these problems have given rise to
much litigation; cases are faithfully reported by our author, and he
accompanies his account with much clarifying and critical comment.05
The time would seem to have come, however, at which it might
be possible to state the naturalia negotii of the contract to make a
will. It follows from the nature of the situation that the results
reached in the decisions of our courts essentially correspond to those
rules of dispositive law which are expressed in the German and Swiss
Civil Codes,3 6 whose time-tested rules might be suggestively used in
the articulation of those of our law. Professor Sparks' careful analysis
of the problems as they have appeared in the case material constitutes
the welcome base for this next step. Professor Sparks has already
gone far in his own formulation of such a set of rules. The manner
in which they have been stated by him will be found helpful and will
meet with approval in most respects.
Indeed, there are only two points where some doubt should be
expressed. Professor Sparks disagrees with those courts and authors
who maintain that under certain circumstances the promisor can,
without committing a breach of contract, revoke the will which he has
made in pursuance of his contractual obligation. 7 Sparks is, of course,
right in maintaining that the promisor's right unilaterally to rescind
his contract cannot be deduced from his power to revoke his will. He
is also right in stating that "it is elementary contract law that one
party cannot, in the absence of a breach by the other, rescind his
35 53 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 4-5.

36 German Civ. Code §§ 2286-88 (1896); Swiss Civ. Code arts. 494, 515-16, 534
(1907).
37 53 Mich. L. Rev. 215, 222-24 (1954).
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obligation without incurring liability for his failure to perform. ' ss
However, it is also elementary contract law that in a contract the
parties may agree that under certain circumstances one of them shall
have the right unilaterally to terminate the contract. Such a term need
not always be stated in express words. The parties may regard it as
self-evident that under certain circumstances one or the other is to have
a power of rescission. Consequently, they may regard it as unnecessary
to insert in their contract an express revocation clause. Again a look
at the German Civil Code may be instructive. According to Section
2294 the party whom we would have to call promisor is, unless otherwise agreed upon, regarded as entitled to rescind the contract if the
party in whose favor he is to devise or bequeath has made himself
guilty of serious misconduct against the promisor. The same power
exists under Section 2295, where the promisee has undertaken to take
care of the promisor's needs for the rest of the promisor's life and such
duty of the promisee is for some reason terminated before the promisor's death.
As in other contracts the mutual rights and duties of the parties,
including third party beneficiaries, are defined by the intention of the
contracting parties as determined by interpretation and, as one would
like to add, by stop-gap law. In addition, there is also the strict law
which cannot be affected by the parties' determination. It has been
established by the legal order once and for all in order to carry out
certain policies in which the community is interested to such an extent
that they cannot be overridden by private individuals. One of these
community policies which has a bearing upon contracts to make a
will is that of protecting a surviving spouse against disinheritance.
This policy is implemented by the two institutions of dower (and
curtesy) and the indefeasible share.3" If Mr. Husband dies he cannot, by his will, defeat his wife's interest of dower or her power to
renounce the will and take that minimum share in his estate to which
the statute of the jurisdiction declares her to be entitled. What cannot be defeated by will should also not be capable of being defeated
by a contract to make a will. Assume Mr. Husband (H), before
marriage, has, by contract, promised to his brother that he is to make
a will by which the brother (B) is to receive Blackacre and the entire
personal estate. Assume also that H has made such a will but that
shortly thereafter he marries. Under the law of most jurisdictions
the will is thereby revoked. However, under his contract with B, H
is bound at the time of his death to have in effect a will which corresponds to the terms of his contract. He is thus bound after his
38 Id. at 222.
39 Cf. Rheinstein, op. cit. supra note 33, at 62.

HeinOnline -- 30 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1235 1955

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

marriage to make a new will, and if he fails to do so, his estate is
liable to B for H's breach of contract. But does this liability exist
to the full extent of the original contract, even if under the law of the
jurisdiction a surviving spouse acquires a dower interest in real
estate and an indefeasible share of one-third, or one-half, in the personal estate? It might be argued that these rights of the surviving
spouse should not affect the rights of the promisee under the contract,
so that H would be bound at law to pay B damages corresponding to
the value of her indefeasible share in the personal estate and that in
equity she would be bound to release her dower interest to B. This
indeed is Professor Sparks' answer.40 It is reached by him upon the
argument that a contract to devise or bequeath is a special transaction
to transfer property and that after the conclusion of the contract
the property in question is affected by it.
In effect, a contract to make a will would thus be a contract not
to marry. Such a contract would be frowned upon by our society.
Freedom of marriage is too important to society to be capable of
being limited by a contract designed to protect certain property interests of other persons. Entering upon a marriage can thus not constitute a legally recognizable breach of the contractual duty to make
and maintain in effect a certain will. Once the marriage is concluded,
its incidents should not be capable of being affected by a contract,
even an earlier one, made between one of the spouses and a third
party. Dower interests and rights to an indefeasible share can, it is
true, be excluded by a marriage settlement fairly concluded between
the parties to the marriage. But it would be strange if the public
interest in protecting a surviving spouse against disinheritance would
have to yield to the private interest of a third party with whom the
spouse who later happens to be the predeceasing one has, before or
after marriage, concluded a contract to make a will. It is of the
very essence of such a contract that the promisor can make normal
use of his assets. It is also essential that he can continue to live a
normal life. He is neither bound to starve nor to remain celibate, and
if he is free to marry, he is free to marry with all the normal incidents
of marriage, including the right and duty to sell assets in order to feed
his wife, and the right of his wife to receive at his death that minimum
interest in his estate to which the law declares that she is entitled. The
interest of society to maintain such freedom and protection is so
essential that it must also be irrelevant whether or not the existence
of the contract to make a will was known to the surviving spouse at
the time of the marriage.
In the last one of his six articles Professor Sparks discusses the
40 39 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 33 (1954).
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"Contract to Devise or Bequeath as an Estate Planning Device." 4'
In addition to a useful summary of the earlier part of the work, this
article is mainly devoted to the statement of the purposes of the contract as we have summarized them above.4 2 There is a brief warning
that the "contract to make a will is not a proper instrument to use
unless the promisor is ready to make a final and irrevocable commitment."4 3 This warning might well have been spelled out. Professor
Sparks' lucid presentation is likely to popularize the contract to make
a will with the legal profession, whose members have been traditionally
skeptical towards it. The contract can turn out to be very cumbersome, however, if it is used indiscriminately. Even if the courts hold
the contract to be incapable of defeating the statutory protection
of a surviving spouse, it will be more difficult or even impossible to
protect the interests of the children of a later marriage. The temptation is great for married people to conclude a contract to make mutual
wills or simply to make such wills. Parties to such a transaction
should know that they might well debar themselves from future remarriage.
In the article on the contract to make a will as an estate planning
device one would also like to find some reference to the tax problems.
There are some strange cases holding that a state statute taxing the
transfer of property by intestacy or under a will does not apply to the
acquisition of property upon the basis of a will made in compliance
with a contract to make a will." Estate planners do not seem yet to
have made extensive use of this marvelous opportunity to avoid state
inheritance taxes. Other problems which one would like to see discussed are those which arise in the field of conflict of laws. In many
respects it appears to be more appropriate to determine problems arising in connection with a contract to make a will under that law which
applies to the distribution and descent of the decedent's estate, i.e.,
the law of his residence at the time of death or, in the case of immovables, the law of the situs, than the law by which one generally
determines problems of the law of contracts.4 5 The intricate problems
which may arise in such connection have never been systematically
investigated. However, we must be grateful to Professor Sparks for
that clear and comprehensive presentation which should go far to
eliminate those confusions which have so often plagued the courts
in their treatment of contracts to make a will.
41 20 Mo. L. Rev. 1 (1955).

42 Supra pp. 1225-26.

43 20 Mo. L. Rev. I, 12 (1955).
44 Estate of Rath, 10 Cal2d 399, 75 P.2d 509 (1937); In re Estate of Johnson,
389 IH. 425, 59 N.E.2d 825 (1945); Bente v. Bugbee, 103 N.J.L. 603, 137 Ad. 552
(Ct. Err. & App. 1927); Matter of Orvis, 223 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E. 88 (1918); Will of
Koeffler, 218 Wis. 560, 260 N.W. 638 (1935).
45 See, e.g, Emery v. Burbank, 163 Mass. 326, 39 N.E. 1026 (1895).
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